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 Liquidity as an Insurance Problem∗
Felipe Zurita †
Abstract
Risk-averse individuals wish that assets concentrate their payoﬀs in states
of high marginal value (that is, highly likely or low endowment states).
An asset or portfolio may fail to do so, by having payoﬀs uncorrelated to
its owner needs or, even worse, by having them inversely related. The
latter, which we call tier 1 illiquidity, is shown to occur in non-Walrasian
markets (where a trade involves bargaining) and in incomplete Walrasian
markets where optimal trading strategies are non trivial. In both cases,
the high valuation of the trader biases the equilibrium price against him.
The former, which we call tier 2 illiquidity, is shown to arise when in-
dividual shocks are privately observed, because moral hazard prevents
contracting on them. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Holmström and
Tirole (1998) present prominent examples of tier 2 illiquidity. However, a
self-insurance model is oﬀered to argue that the importance of this type of
illiquidity is limited from a welfare perspective, provided individuals are
patient enough and can trade in a perfectly competitive, complete—except
for individual-level uncertainty— set of asset markets.
This article characterizes an asset’s liquidity as the degree of insurance it
provides, thereby identifying the basic economic problem behind liquidity
as one of the familiar risk-sharing kind. It also shows, by means of
examples, that the problem arises when asset markets are imperfectly
competitive, incomplete, or both.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: G10, D83, G22.
Keywords: liquidity, insurance.
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11 Introduction
Although there is a large variety of meanings attributed to the word “liquidity” in
the ﬁnance and economics literatures, (almost) all of them can be understood as the
(partial) expression in particular contexts of the notion of insurability, that is, the
ability of an asset (or portfolio) of providing his owner access to consumption goods
precisely in those states in which he most needs them.
It is clarifying to decompose the insurability problem in two parts, or to think
of it as a two-level problem, the separating line between them being the benchmark
in which the asset’s payoﬀ (price) is insensitive to his owner’s needs.
At the ﬁrst or most basic level (tier 1 illiquidity), the illiquidity problem refers
to a condition in which the asset’s trading value depends adversely on his owner’s
needs, that is, a needy consumer ﬁn d st h a th ei sa b l et os e l la tal o w e rp r i c et h e
hurrier he is. This idea is certainly present in the usual intuition of illiquidity as the
“loss due to rush selling,” and is central to more precise deﬁn i t i o n sw ee n c o u n t e ri n
the literature. Two important examples are:
• Lippman and McCall’s (1986) operational deﬁnition, “the expected time until
the asset is sold when following the optimal policy.” They show in a search
environment that the optimal selling strategy has the reservation price property,
and that the reservation price depends inversely on the seller’s discount factor.
The degree of patience is then a key determinant of the expected price the seller
gets.
• The wide-spread deﬁnition that relates price changes to the size of the trans-
action. For instance, in words of Garbade and Silver (1979): “A ﬁnancial
instrument is commonly considered liquid if [...] the instrument may be traded
with a suﬃcient number of participants to make feasible purchases and sales
on short notice at prices near the contemporaneous equilibrium value of the
instrument. [...]” Part of the problem is then suﬀering from adverse price
changes as a consequence of one’s desire to sell; the suﬃcient number of partici-
pants is somehow viewed as a condition for avoiding that. In a similar fashion,
Economides and Siow deﬁne “[...] a market as having high liquidity when the
volume of trade is high and the corresponding variance of the price is low.” A
high number of participants, or a large trading volume, are commonly seen as
conditions for more competitive markets1; more competitive markets are then
1Although this association is usually correct, Makowski and Ostroy (1995) have shown that large
numbers are neither necessary nor suﬃcient conditions for perfect competition.
2more liquid.
It should be clear that an asset that trades in a perfectly competitive market
is, almost by deﬁnition, completely liquid in this ﬁrst level sense: the trading price
is common to all participants, and is not aﬀected either by the inclusion of a new
trader nor by the strength of his gains from trade. In view of this fact, it is not
surprising how diﬃcult it has been to accommodate liquidity considerations in existing
asset pricing models, which are overwhelmingly based either on perfectly-competitive
general equilibrium theory, or in pr i c e - t a k i n gn oa r b itrage theory.
At a second level, a liquid asset can be thought as one whose payoﬀsa r eh i g h e r
precisely when his owner is in the highest need —an insurance contract being a promi-
nent example—. This is in fact the notion of liquidity creation in the seminal work of
Diamond and Dybvig (1983), notion which we also encounter in the recent work by
Holmström and Tirole (1998).
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) study a model of state-dependent utility in which
each individual can either be indiﬀerent between consuming at date 1 or 2, or only
value consumption at date 1. Which state is going to prevail at date 1 is unknown
at the previous date, when the investment decision must be made. Real assets
yield consumption ﬂows at an exogenous pace, and are completely insensitive to the
occurrence of liquidity shocks, which might make consuming earlier than planned
—before investment matures— optimal. Similarly, Holmström and Tirole (1998a, b)
characterize liquidity in the context of a ﬁrm, as a protection from unexpectedly high
reinvestment needs to continue a project, case in which a restriction to borrowing
imposed by moral hazard considerations would bind. Thus, ﬁrms would be averse to
the risk of facing high investment (consumption) needs.
In both cases, perfectly competitive asset markets are assumed. Yet, it is
the unobservability of the private shocks (to time preference in one case, and to
r e i n v e s t m e n tn e e d si nt h eo t h e r )w h i c hp r e v e n t st h eu s eo fd i r e c ti n s u r a n c ec o n t r a c t s —
or contingent claims, for that matter—to transfer the risk, resulting in a tier-2 liquidity
problem.
Diamond and Dybvig use that fact to argue that deposit contracts can be made
to serve this function, whereby banks pool those individual risks and adjust the early-
withdrawal payment to the optimal intermediate consumption level. A drawback
in the argument is that this recomposition of consumption ﬂows can not be made
without creating arbitrage opportunities in the presence of other ﬁnancial assets (see
Freixas and Rochet (1997) and references therein). Hence, it would appear that
the unobservability of the private shock would preclude an eﬃcient allocation of risk.
3Holmström and Tirole, instead of deducing an optimal ﬁnancial instrument, obtain
an optimal portfolio choice for ﬁrms. The optimal choice would in general leave a
residual risk undistributed, despite of the fact that individual shocks are completely
diversiﬁable.
T h ep u r p o s eo ft h i sp a p e ri st w o - f o l d . O nt h eo n eh a n d ,i ta i m st op e r s u a d et h e
reader that level-1 illiquidity refers to the obstacles that arise to insuring a desired
expenditure ﬂow in imperfectly competitive or incomplete asset markets. The point
is made by a series of examples, whereby the illiquidity problem is shown to arise
because of either market incompleteness or lack of perfect competition, or both. On
the other hand, it illustrates with a particular example of the self-insurance kind, that
type-2 illiquidity may not be a serious problem from a welfare viewpoint provided that
individuals plan in long horizons.
In particular, section 2 extends Diamond and Dybvig’s shock-to-time-preference
setup to long horizons, where individuals preferences are subject to permanent, pri-
vately observed, and unanticipated shocks and have access to a complete set (except
for individual shocks) of perfectly competitive asset markets. In the particular case
of logarithmic preferences, it is shown that the utility loss derived from the unob-
servability of preference shocks is negligible if agents are inﬁnitely lived and time
discount factors are close enough to 1. The remaining of the paper is devoted to
tier-1 liquidity.
Section 3 intends to understand the scope of Lippman and McCall’s deﬁnition.
The search world is one in which there is a unique asset, which can be sold at the
current price or kept until a better oﬀer arrives. If besides that Walrasian market
there was a complete set of perfectly competitive asset markets —so that the ﬁrst one
is in fact redundant— then the expected time to sell it is always zero, for, as it is
shown, any gains from waiting correspond to arbitrage opportunities. This fact could
be interpreted as meaning that market completeness allows for increased competition
from diﬀerent date consumers.
Section 4 sketches a bargaining model as an example of a non-Walrasian trading
environment. Being commonly known that the seller could be in a rush, it is opti-
mal for the buyer to structure oﬀers that will sort out patient and impatient sellers.
Price oﬀers will in equilibrium increase at a pace that impatient players cannot af-
ford. Hence, a liquidity shock translates into a lower price or loss relative to patient
individuals. We refer to this as “adverse bargaining” since its origin is the adverse
conditions in which the liquidity-needed person bargains. It is well known however
that outside opportunities will alleviate this problem, for instance through increased
4access to a larger pool of potential buyers. In the extreme, when all potential buyers
are contacted and these outside opportunities are such that there is no room left for
bargaining, we are back in a perfectly competitive world. The overall conclusion is
that liquidity can only be properly studied outside the complete-market, perfectly
competitive environment.
2 Liquidity and the investor’s horizon
This section considers the decision problem of an investor with logarithmic preferences
who, in each of the (possibly inﬁnite) periods of his like makes consumption and
investment decisions. In particular, it compares two situations. In the ﬁrst one,
there are complete markets in the standard sense, that is, there are assets whose
payoﬀs span the whole consumption set, that is, any risk can be traded. In the
second one, this spanning condition is only met for a subset of all states, which
excludes the changes in time preference the individual experiences permanently over
his lifetime. This particular form of market incompleteness, possibly due to the
unobservability of personal shocks, is harmful from a welfare perspective because it
impedes eﬃcient risk-sharing.
However, this form of market incompleteness forces the individual to consume
the same, regardless of whether he experienced a shock or not, only in the last period
of his life, because at any other period he could have made his portfolio holdings
sensitive to his personal shocks. This is not to say that only matters at the last
period, because the last period constraint has an eﬀect on all previous decisions.
Nevertheless, it is intuitive that as the investor’s horizon becomes farther away, this
form of incompleteness becomes less and less important. In fact, the example that
is presented below shows that the utility loss due to the incompleteness becomes
arbitrarily small as T →∞and the individual’s time discount factor β → 1.
The model is standard, with a unique consumption good and many periods
indexed by t ∈ {0,1,...,T} (where possibly T →∞ ). The economy is subject to
production-related shocks. At any point in time, there is a ﬁnite number of events
ω ∈ Ω, that describe current real-asset endowments and payoﬀs. That is, at every
period, every individual chooses a production plan (real asset r) from a set Y i (ω)
which is aﬀected by the state.
A production plan (or real asset r) is a sequence of contingent consumption
ﬂows yr = {y0 (ω0),y 1 (ω0ω1),...y M (ω0ω1...ωM)} of size ΩM,i n d i c a t i n gt h en u m b e r
of consumption goods that the real asset delivers in each event and time elapsed
5from the moment construction initiated τ +1.E a c h ﬂow yr (ω0ω1...ωτ,τ) is assumed
to be bounded from above and below, could be 0, is negative if net investment is
required, and it is assumed that no asset has a life-span larger than M< <T ,that is,
yr (·,τ)=0for τ >M,a n df o ra l lr. Finally, not producing is always an alternative:
0 ∈ Y i (ω) for all i and ω.
Individuals are also subject to personal, unobservable shocks. In particular,
the value of consumption at any period is not known but until the period starts. At





is privately revealed to each
individual to be his valuation, chosen by nature from the distribution function π(δ).





































is the actual history of personal shocks. Ex-ante evaluation corresponds to the
expectation of (1).
Hence, every person’s utility will generally depend on both, the realized value
of his personal shock δ
i and the production-related shock ω. Individual i’s history up


















In the spirit of Aumann (1964), it is assumed that individuals are non atomistic
and hence personal histories have no eﬀect on the aggregate (that is, personal risks
are perfectly diversiﬁable). The common part of history, in contrast, contains only
the production-related shock, for the average personal shock is constant:












t and ht = ht−1ωt = ω0ω1ω2 ···ωt.
Hence, each individual has to choose a production plan from Y i (ω) every period.
If individual i chooses the real asset y∗
ht in the event ht, she will receive the ﬂow
y∗
ht (ht+τ) at event ht+τ and time τ =0 ,1,...,M. Each individual chooses also a

























6Remark 1 Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) setting corresponds to a situation where
individuals live for three periods, in the second period δ1 ∈ {0,1},a n di n v e s t m e n t
projects pay oﬀ at the last period. Since there is a continuum of individuals, the
aggregate state is unique, characterized by a fraction (1 − π) having discount factors
of 0,a n daf r a c t i o nπ of 1.
The economy is assumed to be essentially complete in the sense that all production-
related states are insurable, that is, there is at every node ht a portfolio of real (and/or
ﬁnancial) assets b a(ω|ht) that pays oﬀ at time t+1one unit of the consumption good
in state ω and zero otherwise. We will refer to this concept as ω−completeness, to
distinguish it from full or si−completeness. Let b q(ω|ht) denote the time t price of
such a portfolio, and b q(htω) its time 0 price. Individuals have to make consumption,









































yht (ht+τ) b q(ht)















































































































































































7From (4), it follows directly that, despite the incompleteness of markers, pro-
duction and consumption decisions are separable:











ht ∈ argmaxyht∈Y (ht)
PM
τ=0 b q(ht+τ)yht (ht+τ).




































































































































































































































































L e tu sd e n o t eb yc∗ the solution to (4) (the optimal plan with fully complete markets)









































In this particular case of logarithmic utility, we can actually solve for the optimal






δ0 + E [δ]
¡
β + ... + β
T¢ρ
tW0 ∀t =0 ,...,T
that is, each period consumption will be a fraction of wealth, in proportion to the









































In the inﬁnite horizon problem, the diﬀerence in utility levels attained under























































9Proof. In the appendix.
The reason for this result is that, even though it is not possible to buy a state-
contingent consumption ﬂow for the next period (and hence the marginal utility of
consumption at t can only be made proportional to the expected marginal utility
next period), once the shock is known consumption can be accommodated by trad-
ing in assets. The consumption path —and hence the resource allocation— becomes
arbitrarily close to the one with fully complete markets when individuals are patient
enough.
Hence, level-2 liquidity becomes unimportant —the ability of the asset to accom-
modate consumption needs can be substituted entirely by a carefully chosen portfolio
management strategy—.
The following sections analyze two scenarios in which level-1 liquidity problems
arise; in the former, it is because asset markets are incomplete, while in the latter
because they are imperfectly competitive.
3 Liquidity and the expected time to sell
Lippman and McCall (1986) deﬁne liquidity as the expected selling time provided
the optimal selling strategy is used. The more impatient the seller, the lower his
reservation price and, equivalently, his expected selling price.
By its nature, this search-theoretic environment excludes the existence of other
assets. In contrast, this section imagines that this particular asset is traded as in
Lippman and McCall’s environment, but that the individual has also access to an
ω−complete (in the sense of the previous section) set of perfectly competitive asset
markets. In this new context it is shown that the expected time to sell is zero, that
is, personal impatience does not lead to a lower reservation price.
Before the result can be stated, some notation needs to be introduced. So far
we have dealt with pure securities. An ordinary security is a bundle of f (ht (ω))
state claims in state ht (ω), ∀ω ∈ Ω,t =0 ,1,... Let qf(ht (ω)) b et h et i m etp r i c e
of security f in state ht (ω). Proposition 1 shows that under ω−complete markets,
production decisions are independent of preferences. Hence, the optimal policy for
selling an asset is the solution to
v(ht (ω)) = max
(








10The following proposition says that the optimality of waiting is equivalent to
the existence of an arbitrage opportunity.
Proposition 3 v(ht (ω)) = qf(ht (ω)) ∀ht ∈ Ht,f ∈ F.
Proof. Suppose not, that is, qf(ht (ω)) <f(ht (ω))+
P
ω0∈Ω b q(ω0 |ht (ω))v(ω0 |ht (ω)).
If v(ht+1 (ω)) = qf(ht+1 (ω)), a portfolio of 1 unit of f and −qf(ω0 |ht (ω))units of state
security in ω0, ∀ω0 ∈ Ω, costs today qf(ht (ω))−f (ht (ω))+
P
ω0∈Ω b q(ω0 |ht (ω))[−qf(ω0 |ht (ω))]<
0 and pays oﬀ qf(ht+1 (ω)) − qf(ht+1 (ω)) = 0 in states ω ∈ Ω.I f v(ht+1 (ω)) 6=
qf(ht+1 (ω)), the same argument can be reproduced with regard to the ﬁrst time t∗ in
ah i s t o r ys u c ht h a tv(ht∗ (ω)) = qf(ht∗ (ω)).
T h ek e yi s s u ei st h a tw i t hω−complete markets, if waiting produces an expected
gain, it must be so for all individuals, not just for patient persons. If a liquidity
shocked person faces these misaligned prices, she can proceed as the proof suggests,
buying a portfolio that not only doesn’t force her to postpone consumption, but even
gives her the possibility of consuming more immediately.
T h er o l eo fω−completeness in the argument must be stressed. If the pure
securities (or their equivalent) were not available, there would not be a way of trans-
forming the future gain in present consumption; hence, a liquidity-shocked person
may choose to pass it, depending on her time-preference. This is essentially the
break-down of the separation theorem. Our point is that Lippmann and McCall’s
deﬁnition is meaningful only under ω−incompleteness.
4 Liquidity and the bargaining problem
In contrast to the Walrasian environment discussed previously, this section addresses
the problem of selling an asset to only one potential buyer. Bargaining games are
very diverse and more so equilibrium outcomes. Yet, we develop a particularly simple
example with the aim of illustrating the general point that one source of illiquidity is
precisely the lack of competition among buyers at a particular moment in time, and
more importantly, that in such situation the seller will face a loss if he is liquidity
shocked at the time.
The model considers two players, a buyer whose valuation of 1 is common
knowledge, and a seller with private valuation vs ∈ {v1,...,vS}, where 0 ≤ v1 <. . .<
vS ≤ 1.L e t πs be the commonly known probability that the seller’s valuation is
vs. There are I>Speriods i =1 ,2,...,I, and in each of them the buyer makes an
11oﬀer which the potential seller accepts or reject. Rejection leads to another oﬀer,
acceptance to a transaction in the proposed terms.
In order to stress the time pressure of the liquidity shocked person, we assume







while the buyer’s utility is (1 − q), independent of the date of the transaction.
This formulation can be made partially compatible with the model used in the
previous two sections in the following way: imagine that between consumption dates t
and t+1there are many opportunities to bargain —made oﬀers or respond to received
oﬀers—. Then, the impatience rate for the whole interval corresponds to the realized
δt; the value of obtaining one unit of consumption in the logarithmic case would be
δ
ct, which can be normalized to δ. Hence, the highest possible value of selling the
asset would correspond to the highest δ, δ = δ = v1 while the lowest to δ = vS.
Proposition 4 The perfect bayesian equilibrium of this game is characterized by:




The seller of valuation i accepting the price i at round i, i =1 ,2,...,S,
where either q1 = v1 or qS = vS, depending on which leaves the buyer higher proﬁt.
The reason for this is that an impatient seller has higher gains from trade; that
allows the buyer to screen the diﬀerent types of sellers out, extracting their surplus
up to the point that is allowed by the incentive compatibility constraints.
Admittedly, the illustration is very special in many respects. The property of
separating ascending prices, however, arises in many bargaining models studied in
the literature (see, for instance, Sobel and Takahishi (1983) and Fudenberg, Tirole
and Levine (1985)).
The main point is that bargaining theory does support the idea that impatience
(demand for immediacy) creates “losses,” in the sense usually attributed to the notion
of tier-1 liquidity: had the player been more patient, he would have gotten a better
price. In a perfectly competitive economy, however, there is nothing to bargain over
(Makowski and Ostroy (1995)).
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
The term liquidity was coined originally because it is evocative of the property of
liquid elements to accommodate its shape to the recipient that contain them. Like-
wise, this article has characterized an asset’s liquidity as its ability to accommodate
12its payoﬀs to its owner needs. Two levels of illiquidity were distinguished: tier-1,
related to the property that the asset value does not depend adversely on its owner’s
needs, and tier-2, related to the property that the asset value does accommodate its
value to its owner’s needs.
It was argued that the general problem of liquidity could be modeled as a
problem of protecting investors from personal shocks to time preference. If investors
wish to accommodate consumption in states which they cannot foresee, and which
they cannot credibly communicate, the unrestricted consumption plan cannot be
implemented—that is, level 2 illiquidity arises—. It was shown, by means of an example,
that the utility loss due to the referred unobservability of time-preference shocks is
arbitrarily small if individuals are patient enough (this is to say, their horizon is long
and their discount factor close to one) and have access to ω−complete markets.
Market incompleteness and non-Walrasian markets worsen the problem in the
same way: the investor is not only deprived of the possibility of receiving a higher
payoﬀ than if he was not shocked, but also his higher discount factor makes him
willing to accept even lower prices than if unshocked.
The distinction of the two levels of liquidity seems to be useful because it facil-
itates the comparison of alternative deﬁnitions, which as we have seen, can usually
be put into one of these categories. But the diﬀerences go beyond that. Coping
with level-2 illiquidity is undoubtedly a portfolio problem, and hence it does not make
complete sense to discuss the protection against personal shocks that particular assets
may oﬀer. In contrast, level-1 liquidity is a characteristic of the asset (although also
aﬀected by environmental characteristics). Perhaps this is why most deﬁnitions, and
analysis of liquidity —especially in ﬁnance— only refer to this level.
This research suggests that the study of liquidity requires an understanding
of the causes of market incompleteness and imperfect competition. In particular,
whether there are trading environments and in s t i t u t i o n st h a tf a c i l i t a t et h a tt h es a m e
assets be traded more competitively. The economic value of such structures goes
beyond the static allocative eﬃciency usually attributed to perfectly competitive
environments, because, as the ideas presented suggest, they also facilitate eﬃcient
risk-sharing.
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A history of personal shocks can be described by the number of times each obtained.
I ft h ep o s s i b l es h o c k sa r eN( δ1,...,δN), then let (x1,...,xN) represent the history up to
t,w i t hxn ∈ {0,1,...,t} and
P




































16and the utility diﬀerential can be written as
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